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Service providers may vary service quality depending on whether
they work alone or provide the service simultaneously with a part-
ner. The latter case resembles a prisoner’s dilemma1–4, in which
one provider may try to reap the benefits of the interaction with-
out providing the service. Here we present a game-theory model
based on the marginal value theorem5, which predicts that as long
as the client determines the duration, and the providers cooperate
towards mutual gain, service quality will increase in the pair situ-
ation. This prediction is consistent with field observations and
with an experiment on cleaning mutualism, in which stable
male–female pairs of the cleaner wrasse Labroides dimidiatus
repeatedly inspect client fish jointly. Cleaners cooperate by eating
ectoparasites6 off clients but actually prefer to cheat and eat client
mucus7. Because clients often leave in response to such cheating,
the benefits of cheating can be gained by only one cleaner during a
pair inspection. In both data sets, the increased service quality
during pair inspection was mainly due to the smaller females
behaving significantly more cooperatively than their larger male
partners. In contrast, during solitary inspections, cleaning beha-
viour was very similar between the sexes. Our study highlights the
importance of incorporating interactions between service provi-
ders to make more quantitative predictions about cooperation
between species.
Many cooperative interactions can be seen as an exchange of
goods, services or commodities between two classes of traders8–10.
Here we investigated traders that provide a service to a second class
of traders, such as an ant partner species—for example, lycaenid
butterfly larvae—providing a sugary solution to ants11, rhizobial bac-
teria fixing nitrogen for leguminous plants12 or cleaner fish removing
ectoparasites from client reef fish13. We have used the last example as
our model system. Cleaners prefer the mucus of some client species
more than gnathiid isopods7, the most commonly found ectopara-
sites of reef fishes14. Clients use various actions to make cleaners
forage against their preference15,16, the simplest form of control being
to terminate the interaction by swimming off in response to a cheat-
ing bite17. Adult cleaners often live in pairs of a male and the largest
female in his harem18 and they commonly inspect larger clients
simultaneously. Pair inspections result in cleaners facing a problem:
a visiting client may leave after a cheat, even though only one cleaner
was responsible for the cheating whereas the second cleaner coop-
erated. Hence, the cooperative cleaner loses a foraging opportunity
owing to its partner’s action, whereas the cheating cleaner gains a bite
of mucus. We explored both mathematically and empirically how
these pay-off asymmetries influence the service quality provided in
paired compared with solitary inspections.
We explored a game in which one class of individuals provides a
service (cleaners remove ectoparasites) to a second class of indivi-
duals (the clients). The service entails benefits to both the providers
and the clients. However, the providers may also try to perform acts
of exploitation (taking a bite of mucus) that yield a high immediate
gain for them but are detrimental to the clients. Providers can decide
on the level of service quality they provide, expressed as the frequency
of exploits (the ratio of ectoparasites eaten per bite of mucus). Clients
can decide on the duration of the interaction. In the cleaning mutu-
alism, clients terminate interactions in response to cheating with
about a 50% probability19. In the model, we assumed that clients
have a 50% probability of terminating the interaction in response
to an exploit. Under these conditions, we could find the optimal
exploitation rate for the service provider. We assumed that the gains
for providers from giving the service show diminishing returns with
increasing duration (removal of ectoparasites leads to patch deple-
tion). We used the expected value of all ectoparasites on a client as
unit of benefit. We solve the problem for the cases in which: (1) one
provider interacts with a client; (2) two providers cooperate with
each other while interacting with the same client; and (3) two pro-
viders each try to maximise immediate individual gains while inter-
acting with the same client.
For a singleton cleaner with a mucus bite rate (probability per unit
time of taking a bite) of l, the expected cleaning bout duration is
t5 2/l. The cleaner gain from ectoparasite removal is assumed to be
gs(t), to which the benefit 2b of two bites per client on average is
added. For large t, gs(t) approaches 1. For a cooperative pair of
cleaners, each having the bite rate of l/2, the expected cleaning dura-
tion is again t and the per capita gain is assumed to be gp(t), to which
the per capita benefit b is added, because each cleaner has an equal
chance of biting. We assume that gp(t)5 gs((11 a)t)/2, where a
measures the added search efficiency when two cleaners service the
client. Search efficiency doubles for a5 1, but interference between
cleaners could lead to smaller values of a. As a fitness measure, we
used the long-term gain rate. For an expected inter-client interval of
t0, the optimal bite rate for singletons and cooperative pairs (that is,
the cleaning duration giving the maximum gain rate), satisfy the
equations:
g 0s(t)~
gs(t)z2b
tzt0
ð1Þ
g 0p(t)~
gp(t)zb
tzt0
ð2Þ
which are instances of the so-calledmarginal value theorem5 (Fig. 1a).
A cooperative pair maximises the total gain rate. For a non-coopera-
tive pair, in which each cleaner attempts to maximise its own gain
rate, an evolutionarily stable gain rate satisfies the equation
g 0s(t)~
b
t
z
gp(t)zb
tzt0
ð3Þ
provided that t. 0 holds. Immediate biting will be an evolutionarily
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stable strategy (ESS) for any b. 0, but there can also be an alternative
ESS for which t. 0 (Fig. 1b; see Supplementary Information for
derivation and analysis of equations (1), (2) and (3)). For small b
there is an alternative non-cooperative ESS, for which the cleaning
duration is smaller than the cooperative optimum (it approaches the
cooperative optimum as b approaches zero). The client–cleaner
mutualism involving pairs of cleaners is thus akin to a prisoner’s
dilemma, in which mutual cooperation yields higher pay-offs than
mutual defection but defecting is dominant when cooperating in
single rounds, at least for larger values of b. A general conclusion
from our analyses is that cooperative pairs provide higher service
quality than singletons (Fig. 1b; service quality is expressed as the
proportion of removed ectoparasites per cheating bite) as long as
there is added search efficiency for a pair (a. 0), whereas service
quality would decrease (for a, 1) or stay the same (for a5 1) if each
cleaner in the pair uses its singleton strategy (Fig. 1b).
We observed male–female pairs of cleaner fish in the field using
standard interaction protocols (see Methods). We distinguished
three situations—females inspecting alone, males inspecting alone,
and pair inspection—andwe compared client jolt rates (a response to
cheating cleaners19) between the three situations. In the pair situ-
ation, we also distinguished between jolts caused by females and by
males. In a laboratory experiment, we tested whether established
cleaner fish pairs altered their willingness to feed against their
preference (which translates into cooperative behaviour under
natural conditions7) depending on whether they fed alone or with
the partner. We considered three different possible outcomes:
cleaners cheat more when cleaning in pairs (non-cooperative solu-
tion); cleaners behave in pairs how they behave when inspecting
alone (solitary solution); or cleaners become more cooperative
(cooperative solution). In the last case, client jolt rates during pair
inspections should be lower than the sum of solitary male and female
inspections, and the ratio of preferred to non-preferred items eaten in
the experiment (prawn items eaten per fish flake item—called ‘flake’
hereafter15) should decrease in the pair situation. A tit-for-tat-like
solution to the iterated prisoner’s dilemma1–4 would further suggest
that males and females should equally adjust their behaviour during
joint inspections.
Clients jolted significantly less frequently when interacting with a
pair of cleaners compared to the sum of them interacting with
females and males alone (Wilcoxon test, n5 12, T5 13, P5 0.04;
Fig. 2). There were no significant differences in client jolt rates when
interacting with either male or female alone (Wilcoxon test, n5 12,
T5 36, P. 0.05), but females caused significantly less client jolts
than males in the pair situation (Wilcoxon test, n5 12, T5 6,
P5 0.01). Females also caused significantly less jolts when inspecting
in a pair than when inspecting alone, whereas there was only a trend
in the same direction for males (Wilcoxon test, females: n5 12,
T5 11, P5 0.023; males: n5 12, T5 16, P5 0.07).
In the experiment, the ratio of (preferred) prawn items eaten per
flake items eaten almost halved in pair trials compared with singleton
trials (Fig. 3). There was no significant difference between male and
female foraging behaviour when feeding on their own (Wilcoxon
test, n5 10, 1 tie, resulting n5 9, T5 19, P, 0.05); both sexes ate
significantly less prawn items per flake items in the pair situation
compared with the singleton situation (Wilcoxon tests, males:
n5 10, T5 4, P5 0.017; females: n5 10, T5 0, P5 0.002); and
females ate significantly more against their preference than males
in the pair situation (Wilcoxon test, n5 10, T5 4, P5 0.017). In
the pair situation, males ate the prawn items significantly more often
(on average 70%) than females (Wilcoxon rest, n5 10, 1 tie, resulting
n5 9, T5 2.5, P5 0.015).
Males regularly chased females immediately after the removal of
the plate on which food items were offered. Males were significantly
more likely to chase females in trials in which the female had eaten the
prawn item (median 100%) than in trials in which themale had eaten
the prawn (median 50%; Wilcoxon test, n5 10, 2 ties, resulting
n5 8, T5 0, P5 0.008).
Our model showed that two providers interacting simultaneously
with the same client can face a situation similar to a prisoner’s
dilemma. The marginal value theorem allowed us to explore theoret-
ically how diminishing returns influence the frequency of cheating.
Exploring the time course of interactions may thus make models of
cooperation more applicable to real life interactions, such as coop-
erative territorial defence in lionesses20 or predator inspection in
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Figure 1 | The marginal value theorem for service providers. a, For
singletons and cooperative pairs, the optimal cleaning duration occurs
where a line from (2t0, 0) is tangent to the gain curve (inter-client interval
t05 1; b5 0.1). b, Service quality (measured as the proportion of removed
ectoparasites per cheating bite) is higher for cooperative pairs than for
singletons if pairs have higher search efficiency (cases with a5 1 and a5 0.5
are shown). Service quality is lower if each cleaner uses the singleton strategy
(dotted curve, a5 0.5). Zero service quality (immediate biting) is a non-
cooperative ESS for b. 0. For small b there is another ESS (the grey curve
separates the basins of attraction of these ESSs).
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Figure 2 | Client jolt rates in response to singleton and pair inspections.
Median and interquartiles of client jolt rates for 12 cleaner-fish pairs, with
separate values for males when inspecting alone or with the female partner,
for females when inspecting alone or with the male partner, for summed
values of males and females inspecting alone, and total values for males and
females inspecting together. Asterisk, P, 0.05; double asterisk, P, 0.01.
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fishes21,22. Our field observations and our aquarium experiment on
cleaner fish pairs yielded consistent results that support the coopera-
tive solution predicted by the model. Our results help to explain the
observation that clients with choice options seem to preferentially
visit stations with pairs of cleaner fish23.
Although standard game theoretical analyses of iterated prisoner’s
dilemmas propose tit-for-tat-like solutions1–4, these kinds of strategies
are rarely foundoutsideof humans24.Our twodata sets superficially fit
a tit-for-two-tats model in the sense that males cheated about twice as
often as females during pair inspections. Alternatively, the unilateral
aggression of the larger males towards females for cheating may func-
tion as punishment25,26. Although the importance of punishment as a
controlmechanism ensuring cooperation in symmetrical interactions
has been disputed27, we suggest that both empirical and theoretical
future research should explore how dominance relationships affect
solutions to the iterated prisoner’s dilemma when punishment is a
strategic option for the dominant individual.
METHODS SUMMARY
The model is described in Supplementary Information.
During field observations at Ras Mohammed National Park, Egypt, we noted
cleaner identity (male, female or both), client species, duration of interaction and
whether clients jolted in response to cleaner fishmouth contact (usingmethods as
described previously28). Jolts provide a strong correlate of cleaners’ cheating19.We
calculated client jolt rates when interacting with cleaner pairs and when interact-
ing with the male or the female only. In the pair situation, we also calculated the
relative contribution of males and females to the total amount of client jolts.
In the laboratory experiment, cleaners were offered plates with two different
food types, namely prawn and fish flakes mixed with prawn. The cleaners prefer
prawn to flakes16. However, they could continue to eat as long as they ate only
flakes, whereas eating a prawn item led to the immediate removal of the plate.
Immediate reaction to prawn feeding was possible because the plate was attached
to a lever held by the observer16. Cleaners thus had to eat against their preference
to increase their foraging success. In the test trials, a brown Plexiglas plate (183
12 cm) with flake items placed within 8 black circles (each 1 cm diameter) drawn
near the edges of the plate and prawn items placed within two black triangles in
the centre (Fig. 3) was offered to cleaners when alone, and when paired in male–
female pairs, and the sequence was balanced across individuals. For each cleaner
and situation, the average ratio of prawn to flake items eaten in each round was
calculated as a measure of how much cleaners were willing to feed against their
preference. For the pair situation, we calculated the total number of prawn items
eaten by males and by females, and we noted any aggression between partners.
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Figure 3 | Cleaner fish feed more against their preference when in pairs
than when alone. a, The distribution of prawn items (P, in triangles) and of
flake items (F, in circles) on the experimental Plexiglas plate is shown.
b, Median and interquartile values of the ratio of prawn items eaten per flake
items eaten for ten cleaner-fish pairs, with separate values for males when
inspecting alone or with the female partner, for females when inspecting
alone or with the male partner, for total values of males and females
inspecting alone, and total values for males and females inspecting together.
Asterisk, P, 0.05; double asterisk, P, 0.01.
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METHODS
Field observations. Observations were made on 12 cleaner-fish pairs at Ras
Mohammed National Park, Egypt from September 2006 to November 2006.
Females were identified as the smaller individual in each pair. Each pair was
observed for 400min, with 200min being focused on each individual. In client
interactions with the pair that resulted in a jolt we noted which cleaner had
caused it. In 32% of 1,296 cases, the identity could not be determined. These
cases were attributed evenly to males and females for the statistical analyses. The
statistical analyses required three steps of data processing. First, for each cleaning
station, we identified the client species that had interacted with the pair and with
themale and female only.We then determined for each species the jolt frequency
when interacting with the male only or the female only, and when interacting
with the cleaner pair the jolt frequency caused by the male and by the female.
These values were used to calculatemeans of client jolt rates caused bymales and
by females when inspecting either alone or in pairs. In addition, we calculated the
sums of client jolts when themale and female inspected alone and when themale
and female inspected in pairs. The final analyses were conducted usingWilcoxon
tests in which n was the number of cleaning stations.
Aquarium experiments. Experiments were conducted at the Lizard Island
Research Station, Great Barrier Reef, Australia. Ten pairs of cleaners (total length
of females 6.2–7.1 cm; males 7.0–8.9 cm; size difference within pairs 0.9–2.6 cm)
were kept in aquaria of varying sizes (minimal size 50 3 30 3 25 cm) for a
minimum of 30 days before the experiments. All aquaria had running sea water
and fish were provided with a PVC tube (1 cm diameter3 8 cm) for shelter. All
cleaners were released after the experiment at the site of capture. Cleaners were
trained to feed off Plexiglas plates. With the help of a temporary partition, they
were individually familiarised with the main aspects of the experimental pro-
tocol—that is, that eating preferred prawn led to the removal of the plate.Within
six rounds designed as learning trials, all cleaners ate flake items before eating a
prawn item; the experiment was conducted afterwards.
In a sequence of 16 test trials distributed over 2 days, cleaners were confronted
with the plate either alone or with their partner. The order of treatments was
balanced: half of the individuals started with four pair trials, followed by eight
singleton trials and another four pair trials; conversely, the other half startedwith
four singleton trials, followed by eight pair trials and four singleton trials. During
the day, a time interval of 40min was maintained between trials. We also quan-
tified howoftenmale and female partners ate the prawn item in the pair situation
and noted any aggressive behaviour of the partners (identity of aggressor and of
victim) immediately after the removal of the plate.
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